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THE RYNE© CASE AND LIABILITY FOR INVASION OF 
PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Zdeněk Kühn ∗
Summary: New technologies combined with the internet have funda-
mentally altered our ability to have control over the diffusion of infor-
mation and its impact on human behaviour. This paper explains this 
change as well as the transformation of the concept of privacy itself. 
The main part of the paper analyses the case law relating to local ac-
tivities such as CCTV cameras in private buildings which serve to pro-
tect the property of the camera system operators. The author defends 
the regulation of privacy against the intrusions of providers of tele-
communications and data services and corporations such as Google 
and Facebook. This should be exercised by the law of the EU because 
autonomous domestic regulation would endanger the free movement 
of services across the EU. Moreover, it would be diffi cult for separate 
national regulation to be successful in fi ghting global corporations like 
Google. On the other hand, there is not much sense in the European 
regulation of activities that are local by their very nature, such as the 
use of CCTV cameras in private buildings to protect the camera system 
operators’ property.
1 Introduction
New technologies combined with the internet have substantially 
changed the way we conceive our world. They have fundamentally al-
tered our ability to have control over the diffusion of information about 
ourselves. These new technologies include omnipresent smartphones 
and cameras, whether stationary, attached to buildings, or installed in 
cars to fi lm the course of a journey. Then there is the recent trend of 
cameras carried by drones and similar devices, or the still quite rare 
system of Google Glasses (a camera installed in glasses).1 Such devices 
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1 Google, the producer of Google Glasses, has attempted to make them similar to smart-
phones. See <https://plus.google.com/+GoogleGlass/posts/axcPPGjVFrb> accessed 21 July 
2016. However, they are still at the prototype stage and further development is expected.
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enable their user to post the recorded content on the internet within sec-
onds. Recordings are often made for this very purpose, ie to be transmit-
ted via web services. Even recordings made by cameras whose original 
purposes are different (typically security cameras protecting buildings, 
apartments and other property against vandalism, burglary or theft) 
may subsequently be posted on the internet, usually via various social 
networks, in order to trace offenders.2 
Similar video or audio recordings are just a small piece of the mosa-
ic of the fundamental transformation of the concept of privacy at the be-
ginning of the third millennium. Such records by themselves, left some-
where on isolated data media devices or carriers, or placed on the inter-
net but essentially undetectable, would not signifi cantly alter or modify 
the protection of privacy. The argument regarding the protection of pri-
vacy is rather that the internet, in particular browsers such as Google 
and communication servers such as Facebook or Twitter, represents not 
only an increasing quantity of publicly available information intervening 
in the privacy of the people concerned but primarily a change in the par-
adigm of the concept of the protection of privacy.
This paper analyses the transforming modes of privacy. First, it ex-
plains the transformation of the invasion of privacy in the internet era 
and changes in the concept of privacy itself. The main part of the paper 
analyses the case law relating to local activities, such as CCTV camer-
as in private buildings which protect the property of the camera sys-
tem operators (for the Ryneš case, see below). The author concludes that 
the regulation of privacy against intrusions by telecommunications and 
data service providers and corporations such as Google and Facebook 
is justifi ed. It should be exercised by the law of the EU because autono-
mous domestic regulation would endanger the free movement of services 
across the EU. Moreover, separate national regulation in fi ghting global 
corporations like Google is not likely to be successful. On the other hand, 
there is not much sense in European regulation of activities that are lo-
cal by their very nature, such as CCTV cameras in private buildings to 
protect the property of the camera system operators. The author explains 
that regulation under public law becomes toothless in such cases, and 
sanctioning becomes selective and essentially random. In addition, such 
regulation has the potential to further alienate ordinary citizens from 
the law.
2 See the judgment of the SAC in e-kolo.cz, No 3 As 118/2015-34 of 8 June 2016. The 
owner of an electrical bike shop posted a photo of the thief on Facebook and, as a result, 
the thief was traced and caught. Subsequently, the owner was punished for the invasion of 
the thief’s privacy.
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2 Privacy before the internet and in the internet era
The meaning of the legal notion of protection of privacy has been 
and remains the subject of many defi nitions and concepts. One aspect 
of protection of privacy is particularly relevant for the purposes of this 
paper, and that is the possibility of an individual deciding what infor-
mation about his or her life should become public. Frederick Schauer 
in his pioneering article on this topic succinctly summarised that the 
protection of privacy also presumes ‘the power to control the facts about 
one’s life’ .3 A similar attitude has been taken by R Posner in his economic 
analysis of law. He emphasises the aspects of the right to privacy relat-
ing to the control of individuals over the spreading of information about 
themselves.4  
It is indisputable that the internet has changed the way in which 
we think about human conduct. It has fundamentally altered the possi-
bility of controlling the spread of information and its impact on human 
behaviour. For example, an employer may, through a simple search via 
an internet browser, obtain a volume of information on a job applicant 
which would have taken a lot of money and the work of a detective agency 
at the end of the 1990s. Although most of this information has always 
been part of the public domain, what has dramatically changed is its 
availability due to a new medium which contains such information. Of 
course, the internet existed at the end of the 1990s. However, it did not 
contain as much information as it does today, mainly because a sophisti-
cated browser like Google did not exist. Google and similar web browsers 
can, within a few seconds and in response to a relevant question, iden-
tify and show data (texts, pictures, videos, etc) which two decades ago 
would only have been made available through the continuous surveil-
lance of the person concerned and by questioning their acquaintances, 
etc .5 Such simple access to information of a certain type, although not 
always accurate, is unprecedented in the history of mankind. 
The right to privacy has undergone a substantial change during the 
last two decades. The change may be described as both a quantitative 
and qualitative change. At the same time, the very concept of privacy has 
been subject to a signifi cant transformation.6 The differences in the types 
of interference in privacy are clear when we compare the time before the 
3 F Schauer, ‘Internet Privacy and the Public-Private Distinction’ (1998) 38 Jurimetrics 
555, 556. 
4 R Posner, ‘Privacy’ in P Newman (ed), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the 
Law 3 (Palgrave Macmillan 2004) 103-104. 
5 On the Google system, see the excellent article by O Tene, ‘What Google Knows: Privacy 
and Internet Search Engines’ [2008] Utah Law Review 1433. 
6 See for example Schauer (n 3) 557ff.
244 Zdeněk Kühn: The Ryneš Case and Liability for Invasion of Privacy in the 21st Century
internet with the internet era.7 The modes of intervention in privacy be-
fore the internet and Google were essentially physical: home searches, 
breaching mail secrecy, surveillance of an individual, interception, etc. 
Actors were usually the government, including the police or other state 
agencies, as well as printed or electronic media (radio and TV). Such 
interference was rare and each act of intervention could be perceived by 
the individual concerned, as it could be identifi ed relatively easily.
The opposite can be seen in the internet era. The injured is often un-
aware of such interference, and although attacks may be quite frequent, 
each separate attack itself is usually not intensive. Intensive interference 
generally occurs as a result of traces we ourselves or third persons leave 
on the internet (our own speeches transmitted via social media and dis-
cussion forums; messages from individuals impersonating us; reports on 
us, whether taken from reliable or less reliable sources; photos and vid-
eos we or someone else have posted on a website; insults and fabrications 
regarding particular individuals on forums, etc). In theory, clandestine 
defamation was close to this kind of interference even before the inter-
net was launched, but the range of potential addressees was drastically 
different. 
During the internet era, the government and classical media rarely 
intervene. Should the state play any role, it is because we seek, success-
fully or unsuccessfully, its protection against such interference. Howev-
er, in most cases we simply ignore such interference with our privacy, or 
we are even unaware of it. 
The change in quantity lies primarily in the fact that the number 
of occurrences of the invasion of privacy has dramatically increased in 
the internet era. There are often denunciatory or false statements re-
garding particular individuals in various website discussions. With an 
increasing number of such statements and lies, the individual loses the 
possibility of defending themselves effi ciently against such interventions. 
It should be admitted that the impact of defamation expressed during a 
discussion on an obscure blog is much smaller than that of a defamatory 
statement expressed during the prime time news on a national TV chan-
nel. Libellous and slanderous statements on the internet become a legal 
issue as soon as a large number of them are published and an ordinary 
internet user would be exposed to them on the initial pages they retrieve 
with any standard search engine when obtaining information on the 
person concerned. 
This is linked to so-called autocomplete widgets, which are a very 
popular tool in all search engines. When users type the fi rst letters of a 
word or phrase they are searching for, Google Autocomplete suggests a 
7 See for example FH Cate, ‘Principles of Internet Privacy’ (2000) 32 Connecticut Law Re-
view 877, 877-878.
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list of the most frequently searched for expressions beginning with the 
typed letters. It may happen that, through an autocomplete widget, Goo-
gle or any other browser suggests information on the individual being 
looked up that is not positive about them.8
The whole issue has become more complicated with the fact that the 
role of traditional media is dramatically declining this century, while the 
importance of internet information is signifi cantly rising. However, such 
a development is not always benefi cial.
The biggest changes seem to affect the younger Facebook genera-
tion, which more or less covers people born after 1989. The large volume 
of personal information that users of social networks are willing to pub-
lish and make available to third persons is striking. Such information 
can be removed from the internet only with signifi cant diffi culty. Brows-
ers keep older versions of websites irrespective of whether a particular 
website has been fundamentally changed later.9 The content of individ-
ual internet websites is frequently copied and used by other internet 
websites over which the user of the original site has no control. Should a 
young person publish inappropriate material in his or her youth on the 
internet, there is essentially no chance of removing it later even after a 
very long time when the originally thoughtless youngster may have be-
come a respectable offi cial. Whilst human memory is rather short, the 
internet remembers forever.
3 The advantage of regulating activities of cross-border 
signifi cance through European Union legislation
For a substantial period of their existence, all these phenomena were 
not subject to any intervention from the law. They were independent of 
the state and its authorities, and the business interests of individual op-
erators of web search engines were the main driver in their development. 
Originally, the state was an inactive and helpless observer. An initiative 
to begin regulation under public law was primarily instigated by the 
fact that the unregulated processing of information by large corporations 
such as Google or Facebook might dramatically impinge upon the rights 
of people. However, data generated in this manner have started to be a 
tempting source of information for the police and other state authorities. 
It is not in the interests of the state to prevent the generating of such data 
8 Compare judgment no VI ZR 269/12 of the German Federal Supreme Court of 25 June 
2013. In this case, the plaintiff complained that Google had suggested in connection with 
his name the words ‘fraud’ and ‘scientology’. The Federal Supreme Court concluded that 
people affected in a similar way have the right to demand the elimination of the disputed 
combination or phrase. 
9 However, it should be noted that Facebook prevents its rival Google from searching 
through sites inside Facebook.
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and metadata but to subject the process to fi rm rules. In recent years, 
the state has reacted to these phenomena. It has tried to set certain rules 
and restrictions under which the data accessed from the internet may be 
stored in databases.
Since the internet ignores borders and large corporations such as 
Google and Facebook run their businesses globally, it seems logical in 
Europe to have these phenomena regulated by the law of the European 
Union.10 This is done mainly through the GDPR of 2016, which in 2018 
replaced the earlier Data Protection Directive.11 The GDPR is general-
ly based on the presumption that the collection of data essentially re-
quires the consent of the users concerned (subject to many exceptions, of 
course). However, such consent can be given by ticking a particular box 
by means of which the user agrees with the general terms and conditions 
of the website operator, regardless of whether they have read the condi-
tions (and most users do not). As a result, such consent is fi ctitious in 
most cases.12 On the other hand, if users really read through the terms 
and dislike them, very soon they come to the conclusion that there is no 
alternative, since the terms and conditions of other websites are compa-
rable if not worse. 
The regulation of the retention of data by providers of publicly 
available electronic communication services or public communications 
networks by means of the legislation of the European Union should be 
10 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU of 2000 considers these issues and con-
stitutionally regulates them in some detail. Under Article 8 of the EU Charter, every person 
has the right to the protection of his or her personal data (para 1). ‘Such data must be pro-
cessed fairly for specifi ed purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned 
or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data 
which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectifi ed.’ Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364/01, para 2.
11 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31.
12 See recital 32 of the GDPR: ‘Consent should be given by a clear affi rmative act estab-
lishing a freely given, specifi c, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s 
agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her, such as by a written 
statement, including by electronic means, or an oral statement. This could include ticking 
a box when visiting an internet website, choosing technical settings for information society 
services or another statement or conduct which clearly indicates in this context the data 
subject’s acceptance of the proposed processing of his or her personal data. Silence, pre-
ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent. Consent should cover all 
processing activities carried out for the same purpose or purposes. When the processing 
has multiple purposes, consent should be given for all of them. If the data subject’s consent 
is to be given following a request by electronic means, the request must be clear, concise 
and not unnecessarily disruptive to the use of the service for which it is provided.’ Regu-
lation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation) (Text with EEA relevance) [2016] OJ L119/1.
247CYELP 14 [2018] 241-253
considered reasonable. Providers of internet and telecommunications 
services, and various web search engines, etc operate their business-
es across individual Member States. Inconsistent regulation would rep-
resent a real obstacle to the free movement of services within the EU. 
For example, different regulation of ‘the right to be forgotten’ in internet 
browsers across Europe would not only restrict the free movement of ser-
vices but also cause an unequal position among the citizens of different 
EU Member States.13 Moreover, we should realise that only common Eu-
ropean regulation and not the autonomous regulation of, for example, a 
small country such as the Czech Republic can work against giants such 
as Vodafone, Telefónica, T-Mobile, Orange, Facebook or Google.
What makes little sense is the European regulation of activities re-
garding the publication of personal data which have no global or Euro-
pean impact or signifi cance. Operating a static security camera under 
the roof of a family house and storing such recordings on a hard disk is 
an activity that is purely local. Even the fact that the operator of such 
a camera may possibly place the recordings on the internet (typically in 
order to trace the perpetrator of a crime) does not suggest that such an 
activity deserves the attention of the law of the European Union. It is 
diffi cult to assume that, in the words of the GDPR, such differences in 
the protection of personal data regarding these activities may prevent the 
free fl ow of personal data throughout the Union.14 
13 See Google Spain SL and Google Inc v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) 
and Mario Costeja González, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317. For the fi rst time, the Court of Justice 
(controversially) formulated the European principle of ‘the right to be forgotten’. The CJEU, 
in relation to Directive 95/46/EC, the predecessor of the GDPR, stated that the activity of 
a search engine as a provider of content which consists of fi nding information published 
or placed on the internet by third parties, indexing it automatically, storing it temporarily 
and, fi nally, making it available to internet users according to a particular order of prefer-
ence must be classifi ed as the ‘processing of personal data’ within the meaning of Article 
2(b) when that information contains personal data. The operator of a search engine must 
be regarded as the ‘controller’ in respect of the processing of the personal data within the 
meaning of this provision. The operator of an internet browser has a duty, under certain 
circumstances, to erase the inclusion in the list of results displayed following a search 
made on the basis of a user’s name of the links to web pages published lawfully by third 
parties and containing true information relating to the user personally. The operator has 
a duty to do so even in cases when the name or the information have not been erased 
from the respective websites or their publication was lawful. However, further details of 
requirements are rather cumbersome, and as such their practical application can be quite 
hard. It should be noted that the largest browser operators try to observe the conclusions 
of the Google Spain judgment. The case itself has attracted extraordinary attention on the 
part of jurisprudence. See, for example, Dan Jerker B Svantesson, ‘The Google Spain Case: 
Part of a Harmful Trend of Jurisdictional Overreach’ (2015) EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 
2015/45 <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/36317/RSCAS_2015_45.pd-
f?sequence=1> accessed 1 September 2018, which attempts to point out one of many defi -
ciencies in the judgment, namely the still insuffi ciently elaborated issue of the applicability 
of EU law to cases that are global by nature.
14 GDPR (n 12) recital, para 9.
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4 The Ryneš case
It is one thing to protect personal data in the course of processing 
information with an internet browser whose different regulation within 
the EU may have a negative impact upon the free movement of services, 
or the collecting of data by providers of telecommunications services (in-
ternet providers, phone operators, etc). However, operating a residential 
camera system15 or posting a photo from such a system on Facebook is a 
totally different issue.16
Mr Ryneš was a resident of a small Czech city who had faced ha-
rassment by unknown perpetrators over a number of years, perhaps re-
lated to his activity as a local journalist. He had been beaten up several 
times, and his house had been attacked on many occasions prior to April 
2008. His windows had been repeatedly destroyed. The police were not 
able to detect those responsible and advised Mr Ryneš to buy a securi-
ty camera to search for those accountable for the repeated attacks. Mr 
Ryneš followed their advice and between October 2007 and April 2008 
used a camera located under the eaves of his house. The camera was in 
a fi xed position and could not be rotated. It recorded the entrance to his 
home, the public footpath and the entrance to the house opposite. The 
system allowed only a visual recording, which was stored on a hard disk 
drive. Once full capacity had been reached, the existing recording would 
be erased and recorded over. No monitor was installed on the recording 
equipment, so it was not possible for the images to be viewed in real time. 
Only Mr Ryneš had direct access to the system and the recorded data.
The only reason for using the camera was to protect the property, 
health and life of his family and himself. On the night of 6 to 7 October 
2007, a window was broken at Mr Ryneš’ home by a shot from a catapult. 
The video surveillance system in question made it possible to identify two 
suspects. The recording was handed over to the police and subsequently 
used as evidence in criminal proceedings. 
However, one of the suspects questioned the lawfulness of Mr Ryneš’ 
surveillance system. By means of its decision of 4 August 2008, the local 
authority for privacy protection decided that Mr Ryneš had committed 
offences under the privacy law, owing to the following facts: as a data 
controller, he had used a camera system to collect, without their consent, 
the personal data of persons moving along the street or entering the 
house opposite; the data subjects had not been informed of the process-
ing of these personal data, the extent and purpose of such processing, 
the identity of the data processor, the method of processing, or the per-
15 See Ryneš, C-212/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2428 and the subsequent judgment of the Czech 
SAC of 25 February 2015, No 1 As 113/2012-133.
16 The issue considered by the SAC in e-kolo.cz (n 2).
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sons who might have access to the data at issue; as data controller, Mr 
Ryneš had not complied with the requirement to report the processing in 
question to the relevant offi ce.
Mr Ryneš brought an action contesting the decision, which the 
Prague City Court dismissed. He then lodged a cassation complaint 
against this judgment before the Czech Supreme Administrative Court. 
The Court decided to make a preliminary reference to the Court of Jus-
tice, essentially questioning whether EU law in the form of Directive 
95/46 was applicable. In the Czech court’s view, the operation of a cam-
era system installed on a family home for the purpose of protecting the 
property, health and life of the owners of the home should be classifi ed 
as the processing of personal data ‘by a natural person in the course of 
a purely personal or household activity’ for the purposes of Article 3(2) of 
Directive 95/46, therefore making EU law inapplicable.
In considering the Ryneš case, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union had a chance to declare that a portion of such issues would not be 
subject to EU law. It could have subordinated the issues under a relative-
ly indefi nitely formulated exemption from the applicability of Directive 
95/46 on the protection of natural persons in relation to the processing 
of personal data and the free movement of such data. The referring Czech 
Supreme Administrative Court explicitly invited the CJEU to do so.17 The 
referring court claimed that ‘it should be up to every single Member State 
whether such situations would be subject to the legal regulation of the 
protection of personal data or not.’ 
However, the Court of Justice did not take the opportunity. Instead, 
its steps were rather formalistic, namely a quasi-deductive procedure as 
follows: the objective of Directive 95/46 is to ensure a high level of protec-
tion of basic rights and freedoms of individuals and their privacy in par-
ticular. Thus, exemptions from the protection of personal data must be 
narrowly construed, and therefore the exception for data processing ‘in 
the course of purely personal or household activities’ within the meaning 
of Article 3(2) of the Directive was not applicable, as the camera systems 
had covered part of a public square.18
Since the Court of Justice of the European Union took a formalistic 
approach to this case, ie ostensibly preserving the literal rule when inter-
preting the Directive and spicing it up with a similarly formal jargon of 
human rights, namely ‘the more regulations − the more human rights’,19 
it failed to consider the real impact of its decision upon the reality of 
social relations. However, the Government of the United Kingdom in its 
17 This is exactly what the question in the reference for a preliminary ruling was about. See 
the decision of the Czech SAC of 20 March 2013, no 1 As 113/2012-59, para 15.
18 Ryneš (n 15) paras 27-33.
19 Ryneš (n 15) paras 28-29.
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observation of proceedings noted that if household camera systems were 
not exempted from European regulation, it would lead to a needless bu-
reaucratic burden for ordinary citizens. In addition, in this context such 
occurrences of the invasion of privacy of Europeans which are local by 
nature should be regulated by domestic law. It is the relevant national 
legislature that is perfectly aware of the crime rates in its territory and 
the effi ciency of national police forces in fi ghting crime. This is why the 
national legislature knows best whether, within its jurisdiction, private 
camera systems should be regulated by public law, or whether private 
law regulation would suffi ce (including related issues like the right to 
post pictures of suspects online).
The judgement of the Court of Justice in the Ryneš case raises 
many other questions, in particular what the extent of the impact of 
Directive 95/46 or the GDPR is. The Advocate General in his opinion in 
Ryneš stated that video surveillance of a public place is characterised 
by its continuous and automatic nature, irrespective of the (varying) 
length of time of its storage. He added that ‘by contrast, the legal ques-
tions associated with recordings made using mobile phones, camcord-
ers or digital cameras are of a different nature.’20 However, it is not that 
easy. The logic of the analysed decision suggests that should a student 
be recording their classmates leaving university every day between 11 
and 12 for one week (which would usually be stored in a cloud storage 
system), or should they be recording (for several weeks) on their phone 
or video camera the gradual changes of a particular fruit tree with 
random passers-by being recorded as well, all such situations would 
be subject to regulation by European legislation on the protection of 
personal data. 
The indeterminacy of the impact of Directive 95/46 and the GDPR 
can be illustrated well by an issue not expressly considered by the Court 
of Justice but mentioned by the Advocate General. At the hearing, the 
Court of Justice tackled the matter of how cameras installed in vehicles 
should be treated. The Advocate General in his interpretation considered 
it to be clear that ‘those devices which monitor public streets, including 
persons moving along those streets, cannot be covered by the exception 
and that their use is therefore fully subject to the conditions laid down in 
Directive 95/46.’21 The practice of evaluating the nature and substance 
of such cameras dramatically differs in EU Member States. They are for-
bidden in some countries and lawful in others. An example of the latter 
is the Czech Republic; its Offi ce for the Protection of Personal Data as-
sumes (contrary to the abovementioned opinion of the Advocate General) 
20 Opinion of Advocate General Niil Jääskinen, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2072, para 30.
21 AG Jääskinen (n 20) footnote 43.
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that such cameras are not comparable to cameras attached to buildings 
and therefore not subject to the regulation.22 
With the expansion of new technologies, we can ask how public law 
regulation can be established so that it works effi ciently. If a particular 
product is not generally forbidden or is not regulated at the time of its 
purchase, eg various camera systems or Google Glasses, the public au-
thorities have no effi cient means of regulating invasion of privacy. Practi-
cal examples may illustrate the point. Mock-up camera systems or cam-
era systems placed on a building or vehicle but not turned on and thus 
unused are undoubtedly outside public law regulation. The fact that we 
can see a camera device on a building or a vehicle does not necessarily 
mean that the device is active and therefore subject to regulation. Since 
supervisory authorities have no right to enter buildings and vehicles 
(cars or trucks) in order to monitor such devices, they have technically 
no chance of ascertaining whether the law has been violated. If there are 
any sanctions imposed, it usually happens ex post at the moment when 
the recording is used against the perpetrator of an alleged crime and, 
as a result, it is obvious that recordings were or have been made on the 
respective device.
The GDPR shows an awareness of these problems. Article 58(1)(f) 
states that each supervisory authority in the Member States has the 
power to obtain access to any premises of the controller and the proces-
sor, including any data processing equipment or means, in accordance 
with Union or Member State procedural law. This new power of national 
authorities is not the remedy to the mentioned problems. On the con-
trary, unless the authorities are equipped with Orwellian powers and 
employ tens of thousands of agents to inspect millions of premises where 
personal data could eventually be processed, the new power will remain 
mostly on paper. The authorities will remain reactive, responding to var-
ious sorts of informants and neighborhood disputes.
Such regulation of new technologies remains rather formal. In gen-
eral, it undermines respect for the legal order and most citizens simply 
ignore it. Sanctions for its violation might be imposed only rarely. On 
the other hand, the time and energy invested in reporting a device like 
22 See the Opinion of the Offi ce for the Protection of Personal Data No 1/2015 of March 
2015, ‘Operating cameras on motor vehicles recording space outside the vehicle’, p 3, para 
6: ‘From the perspective of the Offi ce, due to the fact that such processing is without any 
risk with respect to invasion of privacy and the personal data of the data subject (unlike sta-
tionary camera systems, this system is unable to record for its operator a regular overview 
of people and their behaviour in a particular place, and does not interfere with the right of 
dwelling or represent surveillance of employees at work, which is forbidden under section 
316(2) of Act 262/2006 Sb, Labour Code), and, at the same time, a different use of the re-
cording from the camera system on the motor vehicle is not presumed (eg publishing) and it 
need not be the subject of a preliminary search by a supervisory authority, such processing 
is not subject to the duty to report [according to the Czech Data Protection Law].’ 
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a camera monitoring system to a national supervisory authority is enor-
mous,23 which unfortunately results in people evading the law and tak-
ing risks.24 This is why the GDPR moving away from the duty to report in 
similar cases towards the control of how collected data are handled (with 
a particular emphasis on data breaches) is to be welcomed.
Another problem arises when an offi ce for the protection of personal 
data interprets the law in such a way that it is in confl ict with the natu-
ral human understanding of what is just and appropriate when protect-
ing one’s property. An infamous example of this in the Czech Republic 
is the protection of the ‘privacy of thieves’: the Offi ce imposed a sanction 
upon the owner of stolen property who tried to get the property back and 
posted a photo of the perpetrator of the theft on Facebook in order to as-
certain their identity. The SAC in the subsequent litigation confi rmed the 
sanction imposed upon the person who protected his ownership rights 
and posted the photos on Facebook. According to the SAC:
the purpose of operating camera systems for the protection of property 
is not (in short) making a recording for future publishing but only for 
the possible handing-over to the competent authorities for further ac-
tion. The investigation of crimes and sentencing of perpetrators (includ-
ing those committing administrative delicts) is fully within the compe-
tence of state bodies.
If a person posts a photo of a thief on Facebook, it is considered not 
to be necessary for the protection of their rights or interests as protected 
by the law.25 
23 For example, the instructions on the website of the Czech Offi ce for the Protection of 
Personal Data are far from being user friendly. Some forms are so complicated that only a 
person with the mixed competences of an IT specialist, lawyer and personal data protection 
specialist is able to fi ll them in correctly. 
24 Under the old directive, the procedure to discharge the duty to report a camera system 
easily became a bureaucratic ritual. The Czech Offi ce in practice could hardly review, for ex-
ample, whether the decision of the owners of a residential building to place a camera system 
on their building in reaction to vandalism or theft on the premises was proportional. It is 
diffi cult to accept the idea of the Offi ce to substitute the decision of the owners of residential 
units on whether installing a camera system on their property was necessary with its own 
authoritative decision that due to the circumstances the owners should and could protect 
their property in a different manner. The Czech Offi ce even reviewed technical details such 
as from what angle a camera may record common areas in the building or where cameras 
may be installed. Decision of the Czech Offi ce for the Protection of Personal Data No 1/2016 
of January 2016, ‘Locating camera systems in residential buildings’.
25 See e-kolo.cz (n 2). Interestingly, the new head of the Czech Offi ce, Ivana Janů, appointed 
in 2015, denounced the earlier decision of her agency and promised that in future a dif-
ferent decision-making path would be taken by the agency. See the press statement of the 
Offi ce: ‘ÚOOÚ by pokutu v případu ekolo.cz znovu neudělil’ [‘The Offi ce would not impose 
a fi ne in the ekolo case anymore’] 4 October 2017 <www.uoou.cz/uoou-by-pokutu-v-pripa-
du-ekolo-cz-znovu-neudelil/d-27149> accessed 1 September 2018. 
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5 Conclusion
The law on the protection of personal data as developed by the EU 
has a great ambition because it tries to cover the scope of both purely 
local activities and the practice of corporate giants. Consequently, the 
amount of corresponding rules is enormous and their application has 
become a new fi eld for specialised lawyers. Likewise, specialised national 
agencies struggle and often change their interpretation of the law. This 
was the single most important reason why Mr Ryneš fi nally won his 
case before the Czech SAC. Over time, the Offi ce has changed its inter-
pretation of the limits of the scope of EU law with respect to domestic 
household camera systems. Originally, it claimed jurisdiction over these 
issues. However, it later expressly stated that it would not deal with these 
issues because they were beyond its power and subject to the ‘household 
exception’ of EU law. Taking into account the legitimate expectation of 
Mr Ryneš as a household owner, the SAC ruled in his favour. 26 Besides, 
added complication in the legal system and a lack of foresight in EU law 
further weakens legal certainty and the trust of EU citizens in the law.
All these problems lead to the conclusion that regulation under pub-
lic law should not spend its energy tilting at windmills, ie it should not be 
designed to protect privacy in situations where new technologies invade 
it by their very nature. Public law regulation is meaningful if there is an 
apparent disproportion in the negotiating position between a client and 
the provider of services, and where − due to the limited capability of an 
ordinary person of understanding all the specifi cities of internet services 
− there is no informed consent to all the aspects of the services provided, 
such as when using Google, Seznam, Twitter, MyHeritage27 or Facebook. 
A dispute involving an inhabitant of a residential house who feels re-
stricted due to his neighbour having placed a camera on the neighbour-
ing building need not and should not be solved by public law. It is private 
law which provides a suffi cient number of possibilities of how to protect 
ourselves against the abuses of such cameras.
 
26 Ryneš (n 15) part VD.
27 MyHeritage is a global online service whose basic version is free of charge. It helps people 
create their family tree. MyHeritage makes commercial transactions with the data upload-
ed by client users, with only paying clients having access to the data of third persons. In 
the fi rst half of 2016, MyHeritage launched a new service collecting DNA samples from its 
clients. 
